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Davis: A Comparative Case Study of Selected Phases of Law for the Dentis

A C O M PAR ATIVE CASE STU D Y OF SELECTED
PH A SE S OF L A W FOR T H E D E N T IS T *
By J a c k s o n L. D a v i s , A .B ., L .L .B ., D .D .S .
Instructor in D entistry, H ow ard University
T N the preface to his work entitled “ Dental Jurisprudence,” published
in 1892, D r. W m . F. Rehfuss makes the following; observation:
“ O w ing to the wonderful advancement within late years o f the dental
sciences, embracing the discovery of many new operations and methods
of treatment, increased responsibilities are accredited to the dental
surgeon, the neglect of which might involve him in litigation, and
the knowledge thereof may at some period in his professional career
avoid a calamity of a serious nature.

For this reason, a knowledge

of dental jurisprudence would be of infinite value to the young graduate
(and may we add, to the old and seasoned practitioner as w ell) who
too frequently enters upon his professional duties utterly ignorant and
oblivious of the legal responsibilities incident to the practice of his
profession.

A n error of judgment, recklessness, a careless mistake, or

unprofessional conduct may involve him in unwonted
might ruin his whole professional career.”

trouble that

Thirty-five years later, Elmer D . Brothers in the introduction to his
second edition of the same subject says in substance as follow s:
“ Every man should be broader than his calling. T h e time has passed
when the practitioner in any profession may rest content with a
knowledge of those things which pertain only to his profession.

This

proposition applies with special emphasis when the law, to which as
a practitioner, he is ever amenable, is the subject involved. In fact such
law is an essential and inherent element of his profession, because with
such knowledge he is better able to discharge the legal duties and
responsibilities inseparable from his activities.”
W e are in absolute accord with the views herewith set forth, and
on this occasion shall endeavor to present for consideration and enlighten
ment, as our subject indicates, a study o f a few adjudicated cases illus
trative of a few chosen phases of law for the dentist.

T h e discussion

is not designed to prepare any one of us for the practice of law, but
by spending a little while from time to time in such studies as this,
we may become better dentists and citizens by being enabled to dis
charge our special duties with intelligent foresight and to measure our
rights by the accumulated experience of the ages.

Instead o f attempting

* Presented as a Faculty Seminar, March 30, 1936.
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to cover in harem-scarem fashion the whole broad field of Dental
Jurisprudence, we are submitting, we hope, a fairly exhaustive con
sideration of chosen subdivisions of the subject; and instead of a long
drawn cut recitation of abstract principles o f law we have chosen to
bring to your consideration some well settled concrete cases illustrating
the application o f abstract principles o f law.
T h e subdivisions which we have chosen are as follow s:
T he over-lapping o f medical and dental practice; the value of oral
peculiarities and dental records in the identification of persons before
and after death ; the ever present elements of skill, care and ju d gm en t;
malpractice and its various variations; and some selected miscellaneous
considerations.
W h ile some of the citations and references are to cases involving
the practice of the physician and surgeon they will be found to apply
by analogy to dental practice; and may we explain that the great
majority of these cited cases have gone upon appeal to courts of
superior jurisdiction, so that the decisions quoted represent established
precedents in the respective cases.
N o w our first consideration will be the legal limitations on dental
practice or the over-lapping of dental practice into the practice of
medicine.

V ery often the question may arise as to how far the dentist

may go in his practice without being chargeable with practicing medicine
without a license.

T his is particularly true where a dentist is specializ

ing in oral surgery. O n this particular point, there seems to be little
authority or opinion. So far I have found only one case in point. It
was cited by Childs in the October Cosmos 1922, and is entitled “ In
Re Carpenter, 196 M ich. 561.

T h e case was an incurable cancer of

the mouth which was treated by the dentist in consultation with, and
under the direction of the attending physician.

T h e service by the

dentist involved treating and cleansing the cancer daily for several
months and the use of cocain and various antiseptics.

T h e fee amounted

to $358.00, a part of which had been paid and upon death of the
patient, the dentist sued the estate for the unpaid balance o f $138.00.
T h e estate refused payment on the grounds that the dentist was prac
ticing medicine without a license.

T h e lower court allowed the claim

and the higher court in affirming the award said in substance as follow s:
“ W e are of the opinion that claimant is entitled to recover upon either
of tw o theories: First, that the services were those of a nurse under
the direction of a surgeon; and, second, that the treatments given by
the dentist were clearly such as he was authorized to give as a duly
licensed and qualified dentist. N o w while this case was decided in
the light of the M ichigan State Statute, its holding should be of general
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interest to the dental profession as tending to establish a precedent for
future guidance.
N ow in this same connection it may be said that some dentists still
doubt their legal right to treat cases by internal medication.

This

belief should be corrected as it depends largely on their ability. In
treating highly nervous patients a sedative may be necessary and there
are many cases requiring nerve stimulation. Painful conditions often
require internal medication even to the point o f prescribing narcotics.
A dentist certainly might be held responsible for neglect in failing to
use internal treatment where required.

O f course, he is not expected

to prescribe remedies unless he is thoroughly conversant with their
effects and their proper mode of administration.
And now, we come to the other side of the question, the right of
the physician and surgeon to practice dentistry by virtue of his license
as a general practitioner. T his is a question o f interest to both pro
fessions.

A nd in this connection it may be broadly stated that in the

absence of a statute to the contrary, the general medical practitioner
has a legal right to practice dentistry.

This on the ground that dentistry

is a branch of medicine, and a license to practice the latter includes
the former.

T here is a growing tendency, however, towards a change

by legislative enactments making dentistry a separate calling.

In most

states we have separate statutes, one regulating the practice o f medicine
and the other regulating the practice of dentistry.

W here such dental

acts do not expressly except physicians from their operation (which they
do however in many states) some difficulty often arises in determining
the right of the physician to practice dentistry by virtue of his license
as a general practitioner.
T h e question has been passed upon in a number o f cases and the
decisions are not in accord.

Some have held one way and some the

other, and the reasoning o f the courts may be perhaps best illustrated
by a review of a case from each class. As an example of a holding
that a general license to practice medicine also covers the practice of
dentistry, a Rhode Island case adjudicated in 1899 will serve. T he
title to this case is State v. Beck, 21 R .I. 2 8 8 ; or 43 A tl. 366. In this
case the dental act of Rhode Island enacted in 1888 antedated the medic
inal act by seven years, and the dental act did not exclude physicians
from its provision, nor exempt them from its restriction.
Indictment was brought in 1899 against one Horace

P. Reck, a

physician, charging him with practicing dentistry without a license.
PI is plea was, of course, that by virtue o f his qualification to practice
medicine he was qualified to practice it in all its branches upon all
parts of the human body, including the teeth.
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discussion, the plea was sustained. A great many state dental statutes
were referred to which excepted physicians and surgeons and in view
of all precedents considered, it was held that this special dental act
could not be interpreted to apply to licensed medical practitioners.
T his brings us to the consideration o f that class o f cases in which
it was held that license to practice medicine and surgery did not confer
the right to practice dentistry.

T h e case of State v. T aylor, 106 M inn.

2 1 8 ; (118 N .W . 10 1 2 ), will be considered.

T his case came to trial

in 1908 and the facts involved are substantially as follow s: D r. Taylor,
a physician was convicted of practicing dentistry without a license, in
violation o f the 1907 State Dental A ct and he appealed his case.

He

was a licensed physician and claimed that such license entitled him
to practice dentistry on his own patients.

H e extracted two teeth and

took impressions and had dentures constructed and delivered them
and collected a fee.

It was conceded that he did not have a certificate

from the State Board of Dental Examiners.

T h e court of appeals

affirmed the conviction of the lower court and in its reasoning among
many other things said: “ It is true as defendant contends that the
practice of medicine and surgery in a broad and comprehensive sense
includes the practice of dentistry which is medical, surgical, or prosthetic.
In so far as it is a direction of medical science to the prevention, modi
fication, or removal by medical, and hygienic remedies o f the causes and
effects of disease in the dental organs, it forms a part of the physician’s
practice, just as does the treatment of cerebral, cardiac, or pulmonary
diseases.

In so far as it is an application o f surgical skill to the

fractures or to staphvloraphv, it is simply oral surgery, involving only
such knowledge and skill in the use o f instruments as every surgeon
must possess.

In the absence of legislation a certificate authorizing one

to practice medicine and surgery would therefore entitle him to practice
dentistry.
For reasons of public policy, however, this legislature has sought
to divide the field o f medicine and surgery and make a separate pro
fession of a part thereof.
or 43 N .W . 789.)

(R ead St. v. Vondersluis, 42 M inn. 129

It was thought that men who engage in treat

ment of dental organs should receive special preparation on and be
specially licensed to practice that branch of medicine and surgery.

A

Board of Dental Examiners was created and authorized to examine and
determine who should practice dentistry in this state. A department
of Dental surgery was established at the State University, awarding
a special degree.

An examination o f the course shows that it includes,

besides a considerable part of the work required of medical students
also those subjects which relate particularly to diseases of dental organs
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and others designed to insure efficiency in the mechanical phase o f the
treatment and restoration.

T h e dental statute provides that: “ N o

person shall practice dentistry in the state without having complied
with this law .”
T he court further had to say that since the legislature had defined
both the practice of medicine and the practice o f dentistry and made
the two distinct professions, and that the dental statute did not except
physicians by expression or implication it would conclude that the
intention was to require the physician to qualify as a dental practitioner
if he desired to practice dentistry.
W e submit the two foregoing cases as a fair cross-section of the case
law on this subject, and it is obvious from their holdings that as cases
of this kind must be considered in the light of state statutes, the subject
cannot be covered by any hard and fast rule.
H owever, generally
speaking, in the absence of contrary statute one holding a license to
practice medicine will also have the right to practice dentistry. And,
where dental state laws except physicians from their operation, the
physician

of

course can

legally

practice

dentistry.

In

the

states

however, where the practice of dentistry has been made a separate
profession from medicine and physicians and surgeons have not been
excepted, the court decisions construing the law are not in accord.

It

must be stated with emphasis, however, that a physician practicing
dentistry under any condition must comply with the requirements as
to skill, care and judgment.
A nd now may we invite you to consider with us, the value and
importance o f the records o f the dentist and his expert testimony, in
criminal investigation, in identifying persons dead or alive.

I am

of the opinion that in recent years, dental educators, and consequently
dental students and practitioners have failed to place proper emphasis
on this phase of professional training and practice.

I am sure this

matter is readily emphasized to us when we consider the recent attitude
o f the Federal Department of Justice in taking steps to cooperate with
organized dentistry in standardizing dental records as a means of
aiding materially in criminal investigation.
T h e authorities are in accord: T hat the teeth are among the last
parts of the body to decompose, and, therefore since no two mouths
are exactly alike the teeth and jaws furnish good and sometimes indis
putable means of identifying a skeleton or corpse.
Criminal reports abound of instances in which the oral organs were
important factors in determining the identity of a person or a body.
Cases of doubtful identity have frequently been settled by casts of
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the mouth taken before death by the dentist.

In this connection many

questions, intricate and speculative may arise relative to conditions
observed, and if called upon to make investigation, it should be made
with a view to obtaining satisfactory data for an opinion on any subject
which mav be reasonably anticipated.

W hether missing teeth in a

corpse or skeleton were lost before or after death; if before, how
lo n g ; the cause of a certain condition observed or whether such a con
dition could have been produced by such and such means, or is the
result of disease, or existed prior to death, or was caused by death;
these and numberless other questions should claim the attention of the
dentist as an investigator.
D r. Rehfuss, an early writer on the subject, and whom we have con
sulted closely in this study, cites a number of cases of mistaken, doubt
ful, and disputed identity that were settled by means of expert dental
testimony.

H owever, we shall take time to bring to your attention

only tw o cases illustrating the importance o f the subject under con
sideration.

T h e first occurred in London, and is a most singular case

of disputed identity, in which there was between two persons such
a similarity of name, time, place, age, occupation, and circumstances
as for a long time utterly to perplex investigation.
T h e body of a woman supposed to have been murdered was missing
and another woman was arrested on suspicion of having committed
the crime and sold the victim’s body for dissection.

Both direct and

circumstantial evidence brought the crime home to the suspect.

I he

day after the alleged murder, an old woman of the description of the
supposed deceased was found with a fractured thigh lying exhausted
on the street.
from Ireland.

Her name was Caroline W alsh and she said she was
She died and was buried from the London Hospital.

T he missing woman was named Caroline W alsh, and she was also Irish.
T h e prisoner, Elizabeth Ross, insisted that this was the missing woman
whom she was accused of having murdered.

Various points of difference

were established by a number of witnesses, but the chief distinction
was, that while the missing woman had very perfect incisor teeth (a
remarkable and noticeable circumstance for her age, eighty-four), the
other one who had died at the hospital had no front teeth and the
sockets corresponding to them had been obliterated by time.

The

non-identity was further confirmed by relatives of the missing woman.
Perhaps one o f the most interesting cases in the annals o f criminal
jurisprudence, is the W ebster-Parkman trial which occurred in Massa
chusetts.

T h e follow ing is a brief resume of the case: O n November

24, 1849, D r. George Parkman, a wealthy and well known resident
disappeared.

H e was last seen at the M edical College of Harvard
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University, in the company of the Professor o f Chemistry, D r. John
W . W ebster, his friend and protege.

A week after his disappearance,

portions of human remains were found in a vault in D r. W ebster’s
laboratory; other parts were found in a tea-chest, while in a furnace
were also pieces o f human bones.

A m ong the ashes, about 175 grains

of gold were discovered ; also a lower tooth, with a cavity in it once
filled by a den tal operation, three blocks o f mineral teeth with rivets,
but without the gold plates and a great many fragments of bone
belonging to the skull and lower jaw .

T h e bones and teeth appeared

to have been exposed to intense heat.

By ordinary medical experts,

identification of these mutilated remains with that degree of certainty
required by criminal law was impractical.

D r. Nathan Keep a cele

brated N ew England dentist, however, not only identified the burned
and mutilated ja w and teeth as those o f D r. Parkman in a manner
which amounted to a demonstration, but also, from the melting and
chemical effects produced, was enabled to say what had been the means
employed in the partial destruction.

T h e remains thus being identified,

and other evidence pointing so conclusively to Professor W ebster as
the murderer, the jury reached a verdict of guilty on the eleventh day
of the trial.

D r. W ebster eventually confessed the crime and paid

the extreme penalty.
the dental experts.

T h e confession verified the particulars given by

T h e case is cited in the American System o f Dentis

try, in W h arton ’s Jurisprudence and is reported at length in the cur
rent issue of Oral Hygiene under the title “ A Celebrated Denture.”
D r.

D u n n ’s appropriate opening paragraph to the article in Oral

Hygiene is quoted as fo llo w s : T h e artificial teeth of D r. George
Parkman spoke louder than a thousand tongues.
tingling tale of horror.

T h ey told a scalp-

Upon them hinged the solution o f an amazing

murder, the identity o f the victim and the guilt of the perpetrator.”
Interest in this case may be heightened by considering the prominent
social and professional status of the men involved.

D r. Parkman, the

victim, had been instrumental in erecting the M edical School building
at H arvard; D r. Oliver W endell Holmes, an important witness was
Parkman Professor of Anatomy and Physiology, and was a friend of
D r. Parkman and a colleague o f the murderer.

D r. W m . T . G .

Alorton, a dentist, famous for his general anesthetic achievements a
few years previous was another witness. D r. John W . W ebster, Pro
fessor of Chemistry in the medical school was one of the chief figures
in the case.

T h e premier witness was D r. Nathan C. Keep, the dentist

of D r. Parkman. D r. Keep later was a moving spirit in establishing
the College of Dentistry at Harvard University.
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MALPRACTICE
And now as we come to the consideration o f M alpractice and a few
of the many complexing problems that may confront us in connection
therewith, we feel that we have reached the most important phase of the
presentation.

T h e term “ M alpractice”

writers on the subject.

is variously defined by the

Rehfuss defines it as “ bad or unskilled practice

in a dental surgeon, whereby an unskillful operation is performed, the
health of the patient injured or his life destroyed by the improper
and careless administration of medicines.”

A very concise definition

of the term is given bv Brothers, as, “ Improper treatment of a patient
by a dentist whereby the patient is injured.” From Black’s L aw D ic
tionary (2nd E d.) page 751, we quote a more comprehensive and inclu
sive definition of the term M alpractice: “ Bad, wrong, or injudicious
treatment of a patient professionally and in respect to the particular
disease or injury, resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering or death to
the patient, and proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper
professional skill, disregard of established rules or principles, neglect,
or a malicious or criminal intent.”

Notwithstanding the various defini

tions, the authorities are generally agreed that to constitute malpractice
in legal contemplation, the tw o essentials, (a ) improper treatment and,
(b ) injury there from must be shown.

These essentials must coexist in

the relation of cause and effect and not as a mere coincidence.

Noyes

states very clearly that, “ injury to the patient is an essential feature
of legal malpractice.”

He says, that no matter how unskilful, incom

petent, or careless a dentist may be, he is not guilty of malpractice from
a legal point of view unless the patient suffers injury.”
H e further
observes however, that, “ unskillful, incompetent, or negligent operating
usually does injure the patient.”

T h e point is that in suits for mal

practice the injury must be affirmatively proven and also the neglect or
failure of professional duty.

In discussing malpractice repeated refer

ence must be made to the time worn terms, skill, care, and judgment
as malpractice suits are usually based upon a default in one or more
of these elements.

As a rule either ignorance, carelessness, or bad

judgment is alleged and sought to be shown.

M any cases cited as said

before will involve the general practice o f medicine and surgery but
bv anaologv the illustrations of the law are applicable to dental practice.

THE BASIS FOR LIA B ILIT Y
T h e basis for liability for malpractice rests on the duty owed the
patient by the practitioner.

So if the relation o f dentist and patient

has not been established, no liability can be incurred.

Therefore a

dentist is not liable for malpractice in refusing to treat a patient, not-
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withstanding the urgency of the case and the unavailability of another
dentist. T his point of law is clearly and definitely stated in court
opinions in a number of cases, but the case of H u rly v. Eddingfield, 156
Ind. 416 (1 9 0 0 ) while an extreme one should illustrate sufficiently
this point.

T h e abbreviated facts are as follow s: A patient, who was

very ill sent for D r. Eddingfield who had been the family physician,
and the messenger explained the urgency involved and that no other
aid was available and tendered the fee.
but refused to go.

T h e doctor was not busy

T h e patient died supposedly for want of attention

that the doctor might have given, and the legal representative sued
“ for £10,000 damages in wrongfully causing the death o f the deceased.”
T h e trial court dismissed the suit and on appeal, the supreme court
o f the state affirmed the lower court.

T h e opinion in short was, that

a physician is under no obligation to accept and treat a patient, that
the license of the state to practice medicine is permissive and not com
pulsory.

Tim e will not permit the citing of the many other refer

ences on this same point.

W harton, on “ Negligence,” Paragraph 731,

says, however, as to the common law requirement in this connection,
that “ no question can exist as to legal right o f a physician (and by
same token a dentist) unless he be an officer of the government charged
with specific duties which he thereby violates, to decline to take charge
of a particular case.
So it seems to be a well established legal certainty that a physician
or a dentist may refuse treatment to a patient for any cause or for no
cause except his own personal whim.

If, however, a patient is accepted

and treatment is begun or promised, it must be continued unless the
doctor is dismissed by the patient, or unless he gives notice to the patient
that he will discontinue services and gives sufficient time to procure
other services.

LACK OF SKILL OR CARE GIVING RISE TO
L IA B ILIT Y
'I'he courts are not entirely agreed as to the degree of skill and
care a dentist and a physician must use to escape liability for injury
to a patient. A ll do hold, however, that the professional man is not
required to possess and to use the highest degree of these elements pos
sible.

It is generally agreed also that a patient does not have to prove

grosss negligence on the part of the practitioner in order to recover for
malpractice. T h e negligence which renders a dentist liable in a mal
practice suit is simply a failure to perform the duty which he as a
professional man owes his patient.

T hat duty may be expressed thuslv:

T hat degree of skill, care and learning ordinarily possessed and exer-
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cised by members of his profession in good standing practicing in similar
localities.
T he case of Simonds v. Henry illustrates very clearly the law in
this connection.
Simonds v. H en ry, 39 M aine 155 (1 8 5 5 ) illustrates the degree of
skill, care and judgment required of the dentist in the manufacture
and fitting of artificial teeth. Dentures were made for wife o f defend
ant. W hen put in the mouth she complained that they felt odd and
pained her.

T h e plates were filed but still she complained and declined

to pay for them. It was agreed that she take them away and try
them and return on a set day follow ing. W hen she returned, she
said she knew she could never wear them, etc., and left the dentures
without paving for them.

'File dentist sued for the fee agreed upon.

'Fhe evidence was conflicting as to the quality of service and fit of the
dentures.

One witness testified that they were a good piece of work,

another that they were fairly average, and a third that they were
nothing extra.

A m ong other things the jury was instructed that if

the dentist had used nil the knowledge and skill to which the art had
advanced at that time, that would be all that could be required of
h im ; that they should determine from the evidence whether the
dentures were properly made and fitted.

Upon this instruction the

jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
and appeal taken.

Exceptions were noted

Upon review it was definitely and clearly stated

that the instructions were incorrect in point o f law.

Otherwise, every

professional man would be required to possess the highest attainments
and to exercise the greatest skill in his profession.
ment would be unreasonable.

Such a require

Exceptions were sustained and new

trial granted.

82 VERMONT 79, 1906
Illustrative of the law regarding skill and care required of specialists:
W here one holds himself out to he a specialist in M edical and surgical
treatment of a particular organ, injury or disease and is employed as
such he is bound to have and exercise such skill and knowledge in
diagnosis and treatment as is ordinarily possessed by those who in the
same general locality, devote special study and attention to the saine
specialty.
T h e case involved treatment of an eve injured in an explosion in a
railroad accident.

Patient was treated by a general practitioner for

a week and on being convinced that there was a foreign object in the
eve sent him to specialist who casually examined it, treated it for a
few days and sent the patient home assuring him that he would be
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O .K . But, he grew worse and returned to first doctor who removed
a piece of tin an inch long and J/2 inch wide. Held that as a matter
of law the specialist did not exercise the care required of him in diag
nosing and treating this case.

A like ruling would surely obtain in

connection with the services rendered by a dentist holding himself out
as a specialist in a particular field.
Another case illustrating the degree of care and skill required of the
professional man is reported in 40 111. 209.

Degree of Skill and Care Required in Rendering
Professional Service, 40 111. 209
T h e follow ing points of law o f interest to us in this connection were
decided :
1. T h e highest degree of care and skill is not required of a
physician (and would add by analogy of the dentist) to
relieve him o f liability from damages resulting from his
treatment of a patient, only reasonable care and skill are
necessary.
2. If a person holds himself out to the public as a professional
man, he must be held to ordinary care and skill in every
case of which he assumes charge whether he receives fees
or not.
3. W here he is merely asked his opinion as a friend or neigh
bor and not in his professional capacity then no profes
sional responsibility is incurred.
T h e case involves an appeal for a physician where in the lower
court the jury w^as instructed that the physician was liable for what
ever damage might have accrued to the patient by reason o f any want
o f care and skill on the part o f physician.

T h e court o f appeals held

that such charge to the jury stated the responsibility of the physician
too strongly and too broadly as it requires the highest degree of care
and skill and w’here as only reasonable care and skill are necessary.
As regards the skill and care required o f a non-professional volunteer
the follow ing case is in point:
M attliei v. W orley , 69 111., App., 654— 1897.

T his point o f law

was declared: If by treating, operating on, or prescribing for physical
ailments a persons holds himself out as a doctor to persons employing
him and they believe him to be a doctor he will be chargeable as such.
T h e suit was against a druggist by a party who wTent to him with
a hurt finger which the druggist treated w rongfully for ten dates.
T h e result of it was his inability for a long time to w ork and finally
amputation of the finger.

T h e lower court found for the plaintiff
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and held that under the circumstances the defendant was chargeable
with the necessity o f using the skill and care o f a physician.
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

T h e court

If the circum

stances had been different, i.e., the druggist had not held himself out
as a ph vsician hut had merely acted in the capacity of a non-professional
volunteer he would not have been liable either criminally or civilly.

In

rendering this decision the court refers to the same line of reasoning
in the case of M cN evin s V. Lmv reported in 40 111., 209, which was
heard in 1866 and in Richie v. II est, another Illinois case decided in
1860.
A very interesting and significant statement was made by the court
in the case of Ritchie v. W est, the Illinois case referred to as having
been tried in 1860 and is reported in 23rd 111. 329.

T his statement

in substance follow s: “ A professional man undertaking to treat a patient
is held to possession and use of skill which is ordinarily used by mem
bers of his profession.

And whether injury results from want o f skill

or want o f its application, in either case he is equally liable.

This, the

law implies whenever a retainer or fee is shown, but when the services
are rendered as a gratuity, gross negligence w ill alone create liability.
T h e point should be stressed, however, that if the physician or dentist
is employed in his professional capacity then he is chargeable with rea
sonable skill, etc. whether he receives a fee or not, but if the services
are in the nature of non-professional volunteer, gratuitous services, then
he is only liable for his gross negligence.
Very often a patient presents and requests service the wisdom of
which is seriously doubted by the dentist. H ow ever, the patient per
sistently insists and the dentist is often in a quandary as to what his
course of procedure should be.
T h e case of Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497, 1877, appropriately
illustrates a case o f this kind.

T h e case involved suit against a surgeon,

who, at the request and insistence of the patient, had rebroken and
reset an arm and a leg whereby the patient lost the use of the arm
and his leg became crooked, deformed, and permanently lame.

T he

low er court gave jury instructions which led to verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff for 53,000.00.

O n appeal the judgment was reversed

and a new trial ordered on grounds o f improper instruction to the
jury.

In reversing the lower court, the court of appeals among many

other things, had this in substance to say: “ It seems to us to be the
duty of a surgeon when called upon to perform an operation to advise
against it if in his opinion it is unnecessary, unreasonable, or will result
in injury to the patient.

T h e patient is entitled to the professional

man's judgment whether he asks it or not.
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to the operation without expressing an opinion as to its necessity or
propriety, the patient should presume that in the opinion of the surgeon
the operation was correct.

However, if the surgeon when called upon,

advises the patient who is of mature years and sound mind that the
operation is improper and unnecessary and the patient still insists, the
surgeon finally complies, we do not see upon what principle the surgeon
can be held responsible to the patient for damages on grounds that
the operation was improper and injurious. In such cases, the patient
relies on his own judgment and not upon that o f the surgeon and he
can not complain.
“ It might be observed, however, that if lack of reasonable care
and skill in performing the said operation is shown then liability nat
urally would obtain.”
As dental practitioners we are very often faced with possibilities
analogous to these mentioned in this case.

W hen we are requested to

remove a tooth and we feel that it is unwise to do so, or to place an
appliance that might be injurious to the patient, or to render any service,
the wisdom of which we seriously doubt, we should at least discuss
very fully the improprieties involved and proceed very cautiously if
at all.

Malpractice Involving Negligence of Patient
Sanderson vs. Hollan, 39 Mo. Appeal 233— 1889
This was a suit for damages for injury in poorly treating a child’s
broken arm.

Erysipelas developed and the limb was lost.

T h e defense

insisted that the legligence o f the parents of the child subsequent to the
treatment should bar the right to recover. Evidence was convincing
that the treatment in the first instance was improper and the court
held that as a matter o f law the negligence of the patient follow ing
the treatment should not bar recovery but at best should be considered
in mitigation of the damages. It was very clearly set forth that such
negligence as will constitute a defense must have concurred in producing
the injury. Another case was reported in 49 W ashington 557— 1908
involving negligence of patient. T h e suit was based on injury to
patient’s foot through alleged improper use of X -R a y.

In discussing

the merits of the case the appellate court made these material observa
tions :
( 1 ) Upon conflicting evidence in an action for malpractice in treating
a foot by X -R a y , the question o f negligence is one for the jury, where
there was evidence warranting a finding that the foot was severely
burned and the treatment improper and the injury was caused by
placing tubes too near and without any shield.
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(2 ) Ignorance as to the effect o f X -R a y exposure would he no
defense in causing X -R a y burn but rather might make the use of same
negligence in itself.
(3 ) In an action for malpractice such as this is it an error to
instruct the jury that the patient could not recover if she quit the
treatment

before she should have or

if

she failed

to follow

the

physician’s instructions since such acts although adding to the damages
did not cooperate in causing the injury

nor would they bar

the

recovery for injury done.
T h e court in this case quotes from an Oregon case a very clear state
ment concerning the effect o f patients’ negligence in a suit for mal
practice.

T h e quotation fo llo w s:

“ T h e contributory negligence which prevents recovery is that which
cooperates in causing the injury— some act or omission concurring
with the act or omission of the other party to produce the injury and
without which the injury would not have happened; and negligence
which has no operation in causing injury but merely adds to the damages
resulting is no bar to the action, although it will detract from the
damages as a w hole.”
Surely by analogy, a dental practitioner negligently making an ex
traction and injuring a patient could not escape liability by show'ing
that the patient did not return for treatment as he directed. T hough
such failure to cooperate should lessen the damages to be aw'arded.
Negligence of the patient follow ing a negligent act o f the practitioner
does not discharge the liability, but is simply taken in mitigation of
damages.
T h e same is held in D u Buis v. D ecker, 130 N .Y . 325.

M cC racken

v. Smut hers, 122 N .C . 799, the N orth Carolina case, involved partic
ularly the patient’s failure to return for follow -up treatment.

A m ong

the instructions as to law which were given the jury in the case the
follow ing are of interest to us.
( 1 ) T h e care and skill required of a dentist, while not necessarily
the highest known to the profession can not be limited to such as
is exercised by dentist in his own neighborhood, but must be such
as is possessed and practiced by the average o f his profession in the
same general neighborhood or in such given localities or in similar
localities.
F o say one’s own neighborhood or town would render the
.standard of the profession too variable, possibly too low, as the place
might contain only one or two dentists whose qualifications might be
rather inferior and to prove the ability o f each by the standing of the
other would be equally unjust to the profession and to the patients.
Instruction N o. 2
W here
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the fact that the patient after such malpractice disobeyed the instruc
tion of the dentist and so aggravated the injury does not discharge
the latter’s liability.
As to patient’s duty to seek other assistance the case of Chamberlain V.
M organ is in point.

It is reported 68 Pa. 168, and was tried in 1871.

T h e material facts were these:
T h e patient, Hattie M organ sued D r. Chamberlain for malpractice
by which her arm that had been dislocated had become stiffened.

There

was much testimony by the plaintiff as to manner of treatment by
defendant.

A fter some time she went to Drs. Halsey and Richardson

who diagnosed the dislocation and offered to reduce it.

Plaintiff’s

father said that as long as she was improving so fast he should not
have disturbed it. 'Pile defendant insisted that by plaintiff’s refusal
to accept suggestion of D r. Richardson, he should be relieved or that
this negligence should mitigate the damages.

T h e court’s observa

tions were in part as fo llo w s :
(1 ) It is incumbent upon an injured party to do whatever he rea
sonably can to lessen the injury.
(2 )

In an action against a physician for malpractice to an injured

arm he offered to prove by a consulting physician that he proposed to
put the patient under an anesthetic and reduce the arm.
the offer was properly rejected.

Held that

Judgment for $300.00, for plaintiff

affirmed.
W ith reference to responsibility for independent acts of professional
men, as anesthetist and dentist the follow ing points were made clear
in the case of Nelson v. Sandell, 1926, Iowa Supreme Court, 209 N .W .
4+0, or 46 American Law Rep. 1447.
1. T he mere recommendation of one doctor by another does not
render him liable for the other’s negligence.
2. A physician is bound to bring to his patient and apply to his
case that degree of knowledge, skill, attention and care that is ordinarily
possessed and exercised by practitioners under like circumstances and
in like localities.
3. W hether or not a physician or dentist exercises the care and
skill required of him can not be determined from testimony of laymen
or non experts since it is only those learned in the professions who
can say what should have been done.
4. A physician’s liability for malpractice is not determined by mere
failure to effect a cure.
5. A joint employment of a physician and dentist for the extraction
of a tooth which will render the physician liable for negligence of the
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dentist is not shown by evidence that physician recommended the dentist
to perform the operation and agreed to administer the anesthetic and
look after the patient’s interest.
6.

A physician w ho merely administers an anesthetic to a patien

who is operated on by another is generally not liable for the negligence
of the practicing surgeon.
T his case was much involved and concerned removal by dentist of
impaction and the administration of the anesthetic by the doctor.
ja w was fractured.

T he

T h e physician had been treating the patient for

neuritis and painful conditions throughout the body which he attributed
possibly to an impacted lower 3rd molar.

H e X -R ayed the region

and recommended the patient to a certain dentist for extraction.

A r

rangements were made and the physician agreed to administer the
anesthetic and to look out for the patient generally.

T h e second molar

was first removed and in removing the impacted tooth the mandible
was fractured.

Treatm ent for

the fracture by the two

involved

several attempts at reduction and wiring and irrigations, in fact, the
usual routine treatment was employed
of weeks.

over a period o f a couple

T h e instant suit was brought jointly against the physician and dentist
charging negligence in operating and in removing the tooth. T h e out
come of the suit was to discharge the physician of liability for the
dentist’s negligence in the operation, and the case against the dentist
was dismissed as being improperly brought as to place.

Malpractice— Professional Man’s Responsibility for
Negligence of Nurses, Baker vs. Wentworth,
155 Mass. 338-189
T his case involves an attempt to charge a surgeon with the negligence
of nurses at a hospital where the patient was attended after the opera
tion.

T h e physician was not the proprietor o f the hospital and although

it was on his advice that this hospital was chosen still it was held
that he was not responsible for negligence o f nurses in caring for the
patient after the operation and thus in spite of the claim that the patient
thought it to be the physician’s private hospital, since neither he or
any one acting for him had made any such representation to that
effect.
E w ing v. Goode, 78 Federal Report 442 is a case illustrating the
follow ing points with respect to malpractice.
1.

In order to recover damages from physicians or surgeons for wan

of proper care and skill the plaintiff must show both that the defendant
was unskillful or negligent and that injury was produced by want of
his skill or care.
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2. M ere lack of skill or negligence without injury gives no right
to recover even nominal damages.
3. As to warranty.

A physician is not a warrantor of cures in the

absence of an express contract to that effect.

His implied obligation

arising from employment is one that no injury shall result from any
want of care or skill on his part.
T h e case instant involved treatment of eyes of patient over a long
period.

One eye was operated on several times and was finally lost.

Patient sued for malpractice based on lack of skill because he did
not effect a cure.

N o negligence or lack of skill and care was shown.

T he judge in directing the verdict for defendant stated clearly the above
points of law.
Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky., page 20, 1902.
M alpractice suit, which was the outgrowth o f w rong diagnosis or
failure to properly diagnose a dislocated shoulder.

T h e facts were sub

stantially these: On Jan. 31, 1900, plaintiff sustained injury to arm
and shoulder by a runaway team, hitched to farm wagon.
was fractured and shoulder dislocated.

T h e arm

Defendant was called, who

diagnosed and successfully treated the fracture.

H e did not, accord

ing to his own admission discover the dislocation and said that it was
not then dislocated, but admits he found it dislocated on an examination
made after the patient had been discharged.

T h e patient did not know

his shoulder was dislocated until more than two months after the
injury when a D r. Stamper upon casual examination one day in a
store told him so.

H e reported this to D r. Foster w ho was his first

doctor but was told that it was sore and would slowly heal.

The

suit was brought in August 1900 to recover damages for neglect in
failing to discover and correct the dislocated shoulder whereby the
plaintiff was permanently injured.

In the lower court under error in

instruction of the court the jury found for the defendant on appeal the
case was remanded for new trial with direction for proper instruc
tions.

In giving an opinion on this case the court made several very

important observations as to the construction o f law in that state
in such cases, two of which were in substance as follow s:
1. T h e care and skill required o f a physician in treating is not
to be measured by that exercised by ordinarily skilled and prudent phy
sicians in that particular locality in treating a like injury, but by such
as is exercised generally by physicians of ordinary care and skill in
similar communities.
2. T h e mere fact that the result of a patient’s treatment is as good
as is usually obtained in like cases similarly situated will not preclude
a recovery by the patient against the physician for negligence or lack
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of skill, the patient being entitled to the chance for the better results
which might come from proper treatment.
T h e case of T om s v. Aiken reported in 126 Iowa 114, also involved
mistake in diagnosis and treatment of dislocation of the clavicle, and
the verdict was for the plaintiff.

From judgment thereon defendants

appealed and obtained a reversal.
T h e importance of correct diagnosis by the dentist and the recent
trend of the attitude towards the legal requirements in this connection
are both demonstrated in the two cases reported by Leslie Childs in
the 1935 O ctober Cosmos.
629.

One case occurred in Nebraska— 126 Neb.

253 N .W ., 871, and the other came to trial in California in 121

Cal. Opp. 264.

Both cases involved extraction of teeth for patients

who presented with considerable pathological involvement.
pain, swelling, rapid pulse, and fever.

made without proper examination and diagnosis.
litis and cellulitis follow ed.

There was

Injections and extractions were
In both cases ostemy-

T h e suit in the first case resulted in

judgment for the plaintiff of $10,000 which was upheld by the higher
court.

T h e result in the second case was also in favor o f the plaintiff.

It was already set forth in these cases that malpractice may consist of
a lack o f skill and care in diagnosis as well as in treatment.

I he

detailed facts in these cases are interesting and may be read in either
the issue of the Cosmos mentioned or in the Court reports referred to.

The Liability of the Dentist for Infection FollowingExtraction
A large number o f the malpractice cases that the dentist is called
upon to defend are the outgrowth of infection and the many com
plications follow ing extraction.

These cases are surprisingly similar

as to their facts: Usually the patient presents with badly broken down
teeth, possibly hidden roots, and has been suffering intense pain over
a period of several days.
follow .

T h e teeth are removed and complications

T h e patient is ready to trace back the post-extraction pains,

swelling, etc., and charge it to the improper and negligent treatment
by the dentist. In cases of this kind the question o f what the patient
must prove to recover from the dentist, becomes interesting to all of
us.

Generally speaking, he must allege and prove negligence was

the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
T h e application of the rule o f law is appropriately demonstrated
in a W isconsin case reported in 173 W is. 484, 180 N .W . 821, the
abbreviated facts o f which fo llo w : T h e patient presented on Saturday
and a badly broken down tooth was removed in tw o parts.
sac was attached to one root but none to the other.
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not curetted, but was washed out with boric acid and swabbed with
iodine.

T h e patient returned on M onday with much swelling, socket

was washed out and painted with iodine.
directed for several treatments.

T h e patient returned as

T h e conditions, however, grew worse

and on W ednesday the case was referred to an oral surgeon, who
discovered serious infection, curetted the socket, incised deeply, drained,
and finally removed seven teeth and a portion of the jaw-bone.
It was claimed in the suit, of course, that the infection was caused
by the improper treatment by the dentist.

T h e patient among other

things testified that the dentist injected the needle into his lip and
without resterilization injected into the gum. T his was denied by
the dentist.

T h e judgment in the first instance was in favor of the

plaintiff for $10,000.

A

reduction by the court to $4,745.00 was

accepted by the patient and an appeal was taken by the dentist to the
Supreme Court of W isconsin.

In reviewing the case it was said

in substance: T h e evidence sustained a finding o f a lack of reasonable
skill and care on the part of the dentist; it was conceded that there
was infection in the low er jaw .
infection.

T h e question is what caused the

In order to recover, plaintiff must produce evidence to

justify a finding that it was due to the defendant’s negligence.

T he

burden is not met by showing that infection might have been the result
of two or more causes, one o f which was defendant’s unskillful treat
ment. Judgment was reversed and lower court instructed to dismiss
the case.
A Maryland case along the same line and in which the facts are
somewhat similar is reported in 137 M d . 227, 112 A tl. 179. T h e
greatly abbreviated facts in this case fo llo w : T h e plaintiff had a tooth
extracted and the dentist failed to remove all the roots.

There was

post-extraction trouble and after a month or more the patient presents
to another dentist, the defendant in this case, and had the roots removed.
Follow ing this operation there was considerable hemorrhage, pain, and
swelling.

T he patient had been told to return for treatment if trouble

was experienced, but instead, on the day following, the family physician
was called in.

H e discovered necrosis of the bone, and after several

days treatment, the patient was hospitalized. In the course of treat
ment, there was thorough scraping away of all necrotic substance.
Finally, tw o more teeth were extracted and all involved surrounding
bone was removed.

W ithou t further trouble the patient recovered.

Suit follow ed against the dentist N o. 2 who had removed the roots,
on the theory that his negligence and unskillfulness caused the injuries
suffered. "File result in the lower court was judgment for the plaintiff.
A fter a careful review o f the evidence and the record, the Court of
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Appeals reversed the judgment without even a new trial.

It held

that plaintiff had failed to prove negligence or unskillfulness on the
part of the dentist.
By way o f summary in these two cases it may be submitted that
the dentist is duty bound to use ordinary care and skill in his work,
and in the absence o f proof to the contrary he is presumed to have
done so.

It follow s then that in case infection follow s dental services

rendered the burden is on the patient to show the negligence o f dentist
and its relation to the injury as the proximate cause.
M ay we submit further, that while the law in these cases may
appear too simple and obvious to waste time on, yet the proper con
struction of law is not all certain to us, since so many cases must be
carried to the Superior Courts for consistent adjudication.

Miscellaneous Considerations
It is hoped that under this subhead it may be interesting and en
lightening to review the Oregon State Case which involved the validity
of the state law which prohibited advertising in dental practice.

T he

title of the case is Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners
and is an appeal from the Supreme Court of Oregon.
M atch 7, 1935, and was decided A pril 1, 1935.

It was argued

It is reported in the

294 United States Supreme Court Report, page 608.
In this case the follow ing points were decided:
1. T h e fact that an exercise of the police power forbidding certain
forms of advertising by dentists w ill interfere with existing contracts
for display signs and press notices does not touch the validity o f the
regulations.
2. A regulation of dentist is not invalid as to them because it does
not extend to the other professional classes.
3. A regulation preventing dentists from advertising their profes
sional superiority and their prices; from use of certain forms of adver
tising signs; from use of advertising solicitors or publicity agents; from
advertising free dental work, free examinations, guaranteed w ork and
painless operations, held valid under due process clause of 14th Am end
ment, without regard to the truthfulness o f the representations or the
benefit of the services advertised.
4. It is within the authority of the state to estimate the baleful
effects of such advertising and to protect the community not only against
deception but against practices which, though they may be free from
deception

in

particular

instances,

tend

nevertheless

to

lower

the

standards of and to demoralize the profession.
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion o f the court in this
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case and it is hoped that many of you w ill find time to read it care
fully at an early date, because in so doing I feel that the reaction will
be a wholesome one on the attitude o f the reader towards dentistry as
a profession.
Previous legislation had provided for the revocation o f dental licenses
for unprofessional conduct, which as then defined included advertising
of an untruthful and misleading nature.

T h e A ct of 1933 amended the

definition so as to provide as quoted above, additional grounds for
revocation.
Oregon Case
T h e plaintiff D r. Semler sought to enjoin the State Board from
enforcing the law on the grounds o f unconstitutionality. T h e Circuit
Court ruled against the Doctor, the State Supreme Court sustained
the Circuit Court and finally the case came on appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court where it was affirmed.
Excerpts from the opinion fo llo w : ( 1 ) Plaintiff is not entitled to
complain of interference with contracts he describes if the regulation
is not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power o f the State;
(2 ) T h e State was not bound to deal alike with all classes or to strike
at all evils at the same time in the same w a y ; (3 ) W e do not doubt
the authority of the State to estimate the baleful effects o f such methods
and to put a stop to them.

T h e legislature was not dealing with

traders in commodities, but with the vital interest o f public health, and
with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards
of conduct from those which are traditional in the competition in the
market places.

T h e community is concerned with the maintenance of

professional standards which will insure not only competence in indi
vidual practitioners but protection

against those who

would

prey

upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring
promises of relief from pain.

A nd the community is concerned in

providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices
which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members
into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of
the least scrupulous.
It should be heartening in the extreme to know that the highest
court in the land assumes this attitude toward the services we render
our various communities.
Cases: W atson V. M aryland, 218 U.S. 173, 179
D r. B loom , D entist, Inc. v. Cruise, 228 U.S., 588
Graves V. M in n ., 272 U.S., 4 2 5 ; D en t. V. W .V a ., 129 U.S. 114
iMills v. State Board, 90 Colo. 193
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425
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Owner of X-Ray Plates
A very vexing problem very often occurs with reference to the
ownership of X -R a y films.

From an editorial in the Central Law

Journal Volum e 95, page 133, we take this comment on the subject:
There is an interesting discussion of this subject in the Journal of the
American M edical Association for O ctober 1, 1921, page 1121.

It

is there said that this question has never been passed on by a court of
last resort.

T h e writer goes on to say: “ T h e patient goes to the

physician, primarily for a diagnosis of his condition and
treatment as may be indicated.

for such

T h e physician makes an examination

of which the taking of roentgenograms is a part.

If the pictures are

made by the physician himself then they are a part of his records of
the case.

If taken by the roentgenologist then the report to the physician

perhaps accompanied by the prints of the negative is a part of the
clinical record.

T h e diagnosis is based upon the examination and

the clinical record.

T h e patient pays for the opinion and the treat

ment, not the means by which they were determined.
for the plates any more than he does for the apparatus.

H e does not pay
In the absence

of any special agreement, the patient has no legal right to the X -R ay
plates.
Close reflection upon the various cases submitted brings us to the
sober realization, I believe, that while the abstract law covering our
duties and rights as professional men may remain the same, the con
struction,

interpretation,

and

application

of

these

basic

principles

have varied and are subject to vary according to time, place, the temper
of the communities and the temperament of the juries and judges.

It

behooves us, therefore, to know of our legal duties and rights as
thoroughly as possible; to be careful to reasonably discharge our duties
at all times; and to be ready to defend our rights to the last “ ditch,"
either through individual or organized effort.
R eferen ces:—Dental Jurisprudence, W m . F. Rehfuss
Dental Jurisprudence, Elmer D . Brothers
L aw for the Dentist, Leslie Childs
Ethics and Jurisprudence for the Dentists, Noyes
Case references cited.

All Together M en.

Let’s Go.

The National Dental Association

Meeting is August 10, 11, 12, 13, at Washington, D . C.
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